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Abstract 
Introduction to The Problem: At its core, Locke’s main argument is centralised in 
the role of labour, while Hegel’s principal idea lies in one’s will, self-actualisation as 
well as personal expression. As both thinkers posit strong arguments in 
substantiating their views, discussions surrounding this topic may influence one to 
favour a particular theory over the other.  
Purpose/Objective Study: This paper makes a modest attempt to discuss the 
justifications of intellectual property rights by focusing on two well-known 
philosophers, John Locke and G.W.F Hegel.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The research design is exploratory as this paper 
aspires to explore the basis for the grant of intellectual property rights from the lenses 
of both theories. Therefore, the research methodology is purely doctrinal and 
theoretical. The research approach is mainly based on library research, focusing on a 
reading and analysis of Locke and Hegel’s published works, as well as other materials 
such as journal articles, commentaries, and textbooks.  
Findings: This article contributes to the existing body of knowledge by highlighting 
that neither Locke nor Hegel could provide one-fit-for-all justifications of intellectual 
property rights. Nevertheless, it is worth stating that both philosophers do contribute 
thoughtful insights that reflect important values worthy of considerations and should 
never be undermined when framing policies and laws on intellectual property rights.  
Paper Type: General Review 
Keywords: John Locke; Labour Theory, G.W.F Hegel, Personality Theory, Intellectual 
Property 
Introduction 
Intellectual properties (IP) are creations of minds such as literary and artistic works 
(protected under copyright law), inventions (protected under patent law), symbols, 
logos, and names used in commerce (protected under trademark law) (WIPO, 2004). 
Besides, the term “intellectual property rights (IPRs)” refers to certain exclusive 
rights which are granted to owners to do certain acts of prohibiting others from such 
actions, and allow the owners to benefit from their investment in their creations 
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Concerning IPRs, many theories are discussed by legislators, policymakers, and 
practitioners to justify the same. It is also observed that John Locke’s labour theory 
and Hegel’s personality theory are prominent. However, an investigation into this 
subject reveals that some quarters may favour one theory over the other.  It 
eventually begs the question of fairness of such a treatment. Therefore, this paper 
aspires to revisit discussions on both views and analyse their strengths and 
weaknesses in justifying the IPRs. Before proceeding with the discussions, the next 
part will first explain the methodology that this paper adopts to undertake the study.  
Methodology 
The research design is exploratory as this paper aspires to explore the basis for the 
grant of IPRs from the lenses of both theories. Therefore, the research methodology 
is purely doctrinal and theoretical. The research strategy is mainly based on library 
research, focusing on a reading of Locke and Hegel’s published works, as well as other 
materials such as journal articles, commentaries, and textbooks. From the relevant 
literature, this article analyses the theories to extract patterns of their strengths and 
shortfalls. These points are then assessed against the IPRs backdrop to explore the 
viability of the theories’ arguments in providing the basis for justifications. The 
following section will describe the background of both ideas, starting with John 
Locke’s labour theory.  
Results and Discussion 
John Locke’s Labour Theory 
This section begins with a review of both theories, which aims at providing a 
background of the same. One of the most influential theories in the discussion of IPRs 
justifications is derived from John Locke’s seminal work entitled “Second Treaties of 
Government (1690).” Theologically founded, he asserted that persons own 
themselves and their labour, and God had given the world to humans in common. 
When a person works or utilises things from the commonly owned Earth, the outcome 
would become his property. John Locke’s theory that justifies private property as 
natural right (also known as Natural Right theory) was extracted from this excerpt 
“The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say are properly his. 
Whatsoever then, he removed out of the states that nature has provided with and left 
it in, he hath mixed his labour with it and joined to it something that is his own and 
thereby makes it his property” (Locke, 1690/1988). 
 Applying his theory to the IP domain, whenever a person mixes his labour with 
something from the commons (such as ideas, views, or raw material), the output will 
become his personal property because every person has an inalienable right to his 
intellectual labour. Hettinger (1989) further states that intellectual creations would 
not exist but for a person’s perseverance, intelligence, and effort, thus entitling him to 
the fruits of his labour. Resonating Hettinger’s view, Moore (2001) and Himma (2008) 
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unpleasant, laborious, and exhilarating – which further warrants the grant of IPRs. 
Therefore, states have the responsibility to protect the owner’s rights over their 
intellectual property by giving them the right to control how their work is to be 
exploited (Fisher, 2001). For example, if one writes a novel from a specific religious 
belief, creates Youtube contents for online viewers, invents a particular type of spoon 
for Parkinson’s patients to feed themselves, or designs a logo to represent his 
business. Such a novel, Youtube video, invention, and trademark would be protected 
by their respective laws under the IP as the owners invested their labour and time in 
creating them. 
 The embodiment of Locke’s labour theory can be seen in Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention, i.e., the no-formality principle in copyright law (Lu, 2013). As a matter of 
one’s natural right, copyright protection should automatically exist upon the date of 
creation, and no formality (such as registration or notification) is required to be 
fulfilled before the grant of copyright protection. A similar labour-theory based 
justification can also be seen in the patent law context. New inventions need a party 
to expend labour in appropriating ideas and other sources from the common property 
given by God. By mixing labour with these ideas, such a party produces new invention 
which can be beneficial to the public and, as a result, should obtain property rights 
over the same (Tay, 2013; Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Lim, 2003).  
It should be noted that the Lockean labour theory is not absolute because it comes 
with two provisos (limitations). These provisos are essential due to the continuous 
encroachment of technology over intangible matters (Dutfield & Suthersanen, 2008; 
Zemer, 2006): 
1. The Enough and as Good Proviso 
This proviso posits that an appropriation of a property will be considered valid and 
legitimate if there is enough and good is left in common for others. Nozick (1974), in 
his analysis, suggests that such acquisition of property should not cause harm to other 
persons (such as harm of the public being left poorer). In light of this, the grant of a 
patent right to an inventor is justified because the public is not harmed; instead, they 
benefit from the said invention (Nozick, 1974). Hence, the term of patent protection 
should also not last long because it would hinder other persons to produce other 
innovations and devices independently from the same knowledge. The purpose of this 
proviso has been summarised by Wendy Gordon (1993) that the creator should have 
a property in their original works. It only provided that such a grant of property does 
not harm other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the pre-existing 
cultural matrix and scientific. In light of copyright law, for instance, a creator of work 
shall not hold permanent protection over his work. Once the copyright term lapses, 
any persons should be allowed to create derivative works without having obtained 
permission from the original author, and this would contribute to the growing body 
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2. The No Waste Proviso 
Locke stressed that a labourer must not waste his or her property or take more than 
he or she can use, which is derived from Locke’s word “nothing was made by God for 
man to spoil or destroy.” This proviso ensures substantial equality by limiting the size 
of holdings to the amount a person can work directly. John Hughes (1988) impliedly 
regarded this proviso as unnecessary by saying that many intellectual property 
systems neither embody nor require the no-waste conditions as ideas are not 
perishable. Countering Hughes, Donald Richards (2002) opined otherwise. For 
example, in patent law, the no-waste proviso ensures that the appropriation of new 
ideas via patents ought not to involve waste. In this regard, Donald Richards (2002) 
argued that there were a lot of cases where new ideas and innovations had been 
delayed or permanently lost by interests who used patents to prolong their existing 
intellectual and physical capital stick. Appropriated images can also be wasted if they 
are not fully utilised. Essentially, the application of no-waste proviso to IPRs will 
require owners to have enough recourses to exploit their ideas and to ensure 
sufficient access to the intellectual creations embodying their ideas. 
Public Domain and Labour Theory 
Chander and Sunder (2004) define ‘public domain’ as “the resources for which legal 
rights to access and use are for free are held broadly,” – which Dusollier (2011) 
viewed it as an open content space with materials that be exploited by anybody. In 
this particular context, Locke’s theory has also developed a pivotal influence on the 
“public domain” discussion. As aforementioned, this theory requires proper 
management and configuration of IPRs, and this is crucial in avoiding being inflicted 
on others, particularly by the uncontrollable acquisition of property and the wasteful 
depletion of the common. For this reason, Lockean labour theory is a robust 
mechanism in promoting and maintaining a healthy public domain, a view that many 
belief stimulates the formation of novel ideas, creation of new works, and evolution 
of authors (Dutfield & Suthersanen, 2008). In the next part, this paper will continue 
with the second theory in justifying the IPRs, Hegel’s personality theory. 
G.W.F Hegel’s Personality Theory 
Another theoretical writing that attracted more significant attention to IPRs 
justification comes from Hegel’s influential paper “Philosophy of Right (1820)”. 
Commonly regarded as a powerful alternative to Locke’s justification by most 
scholars, Hegel posits that property provides a unique mechanism for self-
actualisation, for personal expression, and dignity and recognition as a person (Hegel, 
1820/2005). 
The backbone of Hegel’s theory lies in the notion of “the will as the core of an 
individual’s existence.” Each person has both internal existence (will) and external 
existence (sphere of freedom). He believed that the sphere of freedom is achieved by 
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does not gain the capacity to concretise (Koutras, 2019; Dutfield & Suthersanen, 
2008). 
Therefore, it can be seen that Hegel’s personality theory focuses more on the 
relationship between property and personality. The theory asserts that personal 
expression is an instrument of self-actualisation that gives moral rights in the 
intellectual creations to the creator, and such outcomes are considered “extension of 
his or her personality. As such, property right should be justified as it is essential to 
the development of one’s personality (Radin, 1982). An example of the embodiment 
of Hegel’s personality theory can be seen in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, i.e., 
the so-called moral rights in copyright law (Yoo, 2019). A further example can also be 
seen in Section 25(2) of Malaysia’s Copyright Act 1987, which embodies the author’s 
moral right on integrity and reputation. Indonesia has similar protections as well, as 
enshrined in Section 24 (right of integrity) and Section 33 (right of paternity) of Law 
No.28 of 2014 on Copyright. As a whole, an author’s work is regarded as an extension 
of his personality; the moral rights principally preserve the author’s integrity and 
reputation in his work (Khaw & Tay, 2017), which precisely echoes Hegel’s 
personality theory. 
Like Locke, Hegel also allows for the public domain. In paragraph 69 of his work, “The 
result is that they may regard as their own property the capital asset accruing from 
their learning and may claim for themselves the right to reproduce their leaning in 
books of their own.” It is argued that third parties may utilise the ideas since their 
mode of expression will produce some unique form of their work, which can be 
further reproduced, i.e., creating derivative works from the public domain.  
Following Hegel’s justification, it is also worth noting the following guidelines 
concerning the proper shape of the intellectual property system, which is formed by 
Justin Hughes (1988): 
1. We should be more willing to grant protection to the products of highly 
expressive intellectual activities (such as novels) than the works of less 
expressing academic activities (such as genetic research).  
2. Because of a person’s persona (including his physical features, mannerisms, and 
history) is a big receptacle for personality, it deserves ample legal protection, 
even though ordinarily it does not result from labour.  
3. Authors and inventors should be permitted to earn respect, honour, admiration, 
and money from the public by selling or giving away copies of their works. Still, 
they should not be permitted to surrender their right to prevent others from 
mutilating or misattributing their works. 
Analysis of Labour Theory 
Locke’s theory may be influential to some quarters, but it is not without criticisms. 
The first account relates to the role of labour. Hume (1978) and Waldrom (1983) 
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of mixing action with an object is rather preposterous. In contrast, Mossoff (2012), 
Russel (2004), and Simmons (1998) countered by stating that the idea of “mixing 
labour” was just a metaphor to illustrate activities that a person engages in creating 
something meaningful in his life – like transforming wheat into bread, and timber into 
houses. In this regard, this paper intends to agree with the latter’s argument as such 
analogy also reflects the activities and essential sources (e.g., research, budgets, and 
time) engaged in the IP domain.  
Besides, it is impossible to search for intellectual creations that exist from nothing as 
most of them, especially copyright-protected works, are influenced by previous 
existing works and authors (Dutfield & Suthersanen, 2008). Even if some inventions 
can be independently created, Penrose (1953) questioned the rationale of giving a 
patent right to the first inventor and deprive the second inventor based on the 
natural-labour basis. Just because the later parties are unlucky to be second in time, 
that alone is not a strong reason to stop him of his right as both parties have invested 
their time and labour in producing the inventions. Therefore, expanding from the 
above views, this article criticises the labour theory for being too vague and, to some 
extent – selective, as it does not provide a clear guideline on the grant of right in this 
instance. In other words, while it may be plausible to confer the IPRs for the labour 
that is poured into the creation of products, it is also quite incoherent to conclude that 
the value of intellectual creation is entirely attributable to the labour of an individual. 
It is because scholarly results may and may not be created from something. 
Besides, under Locke’s labour theory, it seems that almost everyone (such as 
individuals, corporations, performers) can be given IPRs, and indeed, many industries 
would fervently support this theory as it would work to their advantage (Dutfield & 
Suthersanen, 2008; Zemer, 2006). This premise is also questionable. While it may be 
practical to confer the IPRs in a simple straight forward work project where one may 
quickly identify the relevant contributor, the application of the said theory seems 
problematic when it involves multiple parties with complex distributions of efforts 
labours. For instance, the development of a complicated piece of software. Locke’s 
labour theory does not guide as to how this jointly held property might function in 
this instance. In another perspective, the application of Locke’s labour theory may be 
quite unfair as it tends to grant the IPRs to products that are created from a simple 
project and exclude others into the state of ambiguity. 
Most intellectual creations in this modern era are the results of processes of labour 
that are distributed across time, investors, organisations, and industries. This chain 
of relationships may involve the uneven distribution of labour, skills, and investment. 
Logically speaking, significant parties would need to have more of a claim to a 
property right than the contributors of lesser significance. Nonetheless, Locke’s 
labour theory does not guide in this area as well. In this regard, Aplin and Davis (2013) 
argued that it is unclear why ‘labour’ should entitle an entity to ownership over the 
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Another problem with the Lockean labour theory is that labour is an imprecise 
mechanism for designating intangible property boundaries. Aplin and Davis (2013) 
quoted an example of an author who has developed a detailed love story. It tells the 
typical plot of two lovers whose love is prevented because of their different 
backgrounds – in this scenario, are we to conclude that the author should own every 
aspect of the story? Concerning this point, another concern arises as to how the 
property’s boundary is to be determined by using the Lockean labour theory. If one 
works over a few square feet of land, he will have the right over that piece of land, and 
not the entire land. However, in other circumstances, the Labour theory seems to be 
unworkable. Nozick (1974) was doubtful with this proposition when he asked, “If I 
own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly 
throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated 
my tomato juice?” 
Further, John Locke also mentioned that God had given the Earth to humankind in 
common, and the humanity may find limited resources of subject matter (such as land 
and water), and resources with unlimited capacity (such as ideas). In this regard, 
Arnold Plant, citing David Hume’s seminal work ‘Enquiry Concerning Principles of 
Morals,’ states that property right becomes significant when the objects are scarce. 
Still, the right becomes purposeless when there are plenty (Plant, 1934). In this 
present discourse, there is no scarcity in infinite resources such as intellectual 
property, which can be consumed and utilised without the supply being exhausted. 
As such, it is argued that the Lockean theory is relevant to the subject matter of ‘finite 
capacity’ but not in instances of ‘infinite resources’ such as intellectual property 
(Dutfield & Suthersanen, 2008; Zemer, 2006). Hence, this paper observes that it is 
easy to analyse and conceptualise subject matters such as land and water as there are 
potentially usable by anyone and everyone. Still, when it comes to abstract objects 
and concepts such as ideas, it isn’t easy to visualise, such as being owned in common.   
Analysis of Personality Theory 
If the difficulty with Locke’s Theory arises from the questionable role of one’s labour, 
Hegel’s justification stems from the definition of ‘personality’ itself. The term 
‘personality’ embodies a ‘pattern of thinking’ or ‘reputation.” However, Michael 
Spence (2002) posits that it is different from ‘reputation’ – instead, the term means 
‘self-presentation’ (including self-expression). Following Hegel’s thought on that 
matter, it can be said that one may agree on the nature of “personality,” but it is argued 
in doubt as to whether ‘personality’ can be distinguished in the creator’s works. 
Many theorists contended that the application of Hegel’s theory could be seen 
effectively in literary and artistic works. For example, Justin Hughes eloquently put it, 
“Some works are better suited to display a creator’s personality” – such as novels, 
poems, and fine art – as these are receptacles for personality (Hughes, 1988). Justin 
Hughes (1988) further stated that works such as inventions, microchips, and 
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embody utilitarian solutions to particular needs, not the personality of the inventor. 
Here are examples to illustrate Hughe’s concern: 
1. Songs are produced by composers and musicians to meet the market needs and 
consumer’s growing interests – and not only to portray or ingrain their 
personality in the products.  
2. Thomas Edison, when he invented the light bulb, searched for the filament 
material that would burn the longest, not a filament that reflects his personality.  
3. Guglielmo Marconi, in the wireless field, chose a particular wavelength for his 
radio because it could travel much farther than waves slightly longer, not because 
of a preference of self-expression. 
4. Melitta Bentz, an inventor of the coffee filter, experimented with various means 
but ended up using blotting paper from school exercise books, at it gave clean-
finished brew. Here, it is impossible to conclude her effort with coffee-filter as 
‘embodying her personality.’ 
Besides, Justin Hughes has also pointed out one fundamental difficulty with this 
theory. As explained above, in Locke’s labour theory, some intellectual creations have 
no apparent social value or require no labour to produce, leaving these pieces of 
property unjustified by the labour theory. Hegel’s personality theory encounters the 
same problem as well, especially with intellectual creations that reflect little or no 
personality from their creators. Justin Hughes (1988) stated that “Personality is 
manifested to varying degrees in different objects.” In light of his argument, one may 
find difficulty in determining which intellectual creations embody more personality 
than others – which leads to a question of varying degrees of protection – should more 
character imply more protections? What if it involves an intellectual creation emerges 
from a joint-authorship and artistry – the same difficulty faced by Locke’s labour 
theory, which remains unanswered.  
Conclusion 
This article has provided a brief background and debates on two critical theories in 
justifying the IPRs. In sum, Locke’s main argument is centralised in the role of labour, 
while Hegel focuses on one’s will, self-actualisation as well as personal expression. 
Based on the above discussions, it is observed that both Locke and Hegel provided 
strong arguments for their idea. Upon careful examination of their thoughts, some 
quarters may incline to favor one theory over the other by fervently highlighting the 
shortfalls of the theories. Such a practice must be celebrated with caution to induce 
good progress of knowledge in this area. However, one fact that could not be 
discredited is that neither Locke nor Hegel could provide a comprehensive 
justification for IPRs. Put it more simply; they are not superior to one another as both 
theories have their strengths and weaknesses. Be that as it may, this paper believes 
that the discussions on this aspect will continue to grow, and it is worth stating that 
both thinkers do contribute thoughtful theories to understand the grant of IPRs 
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Hegel could provide a reasonable basis to substantiate the creator’s IPRs and 
eventually secure their beneficial interests. 
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